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

DAN SMOOT

OUR ASIAN WARS

For about 1000 years (beginning in the 5th century of the Christian era), Asian hordes ravaged and pillaged Western Civilization, until it was almost destroyed. Relative calm in the East-West conflict prevailed for the next 200 years, while there was revival in the West, decay in the East. Then came approximately 300 years of Western colonialism in Asia. Asia seemed to have sunk into deep slumber.[1,2]

On March 31, 1854, Commodore M. C. Perry of the United States Navy forced Japan to open her doors to Western influence. Reverberations of that action aroused the sleeping Asian giant. Within 50 years, Japan—armed and industrialized in imitation, and with the help, of the West —was at war with a major Western power: Russia. Japan won the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 —the first victory of Eastern yellow men over Western white men in centuries. Astute Western observers (watching with troubled spirits as Japanese paraded white European prisoners of war through the streets of Tokyo in 1905) tried to remind the West of those ten bloody centuries when yellow hordes, riding with men like Attila and Jenghiz Khan, plundered and murdered in the West. To no avail: those who warned of the yellow peril were scorned. The Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia (mediated by Theodore Roosevelt, signed at Portsmouth, September 5, 1905) was the first formal recognition of a modern Asian nation as a major world power.[1, 2]

Getting into World War I on the side of the victorious allies (without suffering the cost and ravages of war), Japan emerged from that conflict enormously strengthened. In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles gave Japan protectorates and spheres of influence which made her not just a national, but an imperial, power.[1, 2] In that same year (1919), H. M. Hyndman wrote, in *The Awakening of Asia*:

"With all the facts before us, and with prejudice thrown aside, we are still unable to lay bare the causes of the gigantic Asian movements of the past. They were certainly not all economic in their origin, unless we stretch the boundaries of theory so far as to include the massacre of

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whole populations and the destruction of their wealth within the limit of the invaders' desire for material gain. And, whether these movements arose from material or emotional causes, they . . . may occur again . . . . A new Mohammed is quite likely to make his appearance as a new Buddha, a reborn Confucius, or a modern Christ . . . .

"Asia raided and scourged Europe for more than a thousand years. Now, for five hundred years, the counterattack of Europe upon Asia has been steadily going on, and it may be that the land of long memories will cherish some desire to avenge this period of wrong and rapine in turn. The seed of hatred has already been but too well sown."[2]

Eighteen years later (1937), General Douglas MacArthur (then stationed in the Philippines) warned President Franklin D. Roosevelt that Japan was an aggressive, military threat in the Pacific and that the Soviets were involved in Japanese machinations. The Roosevelt administration, always impatient with criticism of the Soviets, ignored the warning. Consequently, operations of Soviet agents (in Western capitals as well as in Tokyo) influenced policies which deflected Japanese aggression away from Soviet territories, toward American, British, and Dutch possessions.[3, 4]

The Japanese attack on American outposts, from the Philippines to Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, virtually destroyed American naval power in the Pacific, leaving the Japanese navy supreme. During dark and perilous months, it seemed (to practically all except MacArthur) that Japan might produce the modern Attila to scourge the West anew with Asian multitudes; but gallant men of the West, under the brilliant leadership of MacArthur, destroyed Japanese power.[3, 4]

The Asian threat to Western Civilization could have been removed, if MacArthur's counsel had prevailed; but it did not. President Roosevelt made, and President Truman later confirmed, arrangements to delay the end of the Pacific war until the Soviets were at leisure to enter. Having maintained a treaty of friendship with Japan throughout the war, the Soviets broke the treaty and sent their American-equipped Siberian armies into Manchuria five days before we accepted Japanese surrender. Within a year, the Soviets had pillaged a billion dollars' worth of war booty in Manchuria[5] and set up a communist puppet state in North Korea. When they withdrew from Manchuria, the Soviets left Chinese communists in control, armed (with American and Japanese equipment) for the conquest of all China.

Our military men had eliminated Japan as the power which would mobilize East against West. Our politicians had given away the fruits of that victory, helping to establish in Asia a power far more sinister than Japan ever was. Communism was the new religion to inflame the limitless, barbaric hordes of Asia. History repeats, but does not duplicate, itself. During ten centuries following the fall of the Western Roman empire, it was the force of military leaders like Attila and Jenghiz Kahn that stirred and mobilized East against West. In the twentieth century, it is the force of communism.

Korea

In 1949, communists completed their conquest of the Chinese mainland. On June 24, 1950, more than 200,000 North Koreans (directed by Soviet military experts and armed with Soviet equipment) invaded South Korea. President Truman ordered General MacArthur (then Supreme Commander in charge of the occupation and rehabilitation of Japan) to help South Korea with air and naval power. On June 27, 1950, Truman ordered MacArthur to use all available American forces, in a United Nations effort to expel communists from Korea. The first UN directive to MacArthur appointed him Commander-in-Chief of UN forces and ordered him "to restore peace, order and unity to the entire Korean Peninsula." Truman's directive to MacArthur, issued about the same time, said about the same thing.[2]

Though the UN called on other members to assist in the Korean war, none ever sent more than token forces—just enough to create problems of multination command for our generals, not enough to help. On the other hand, substantial aid offered

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by Chiang Kai-shek was rejected.[3, 4, 6] On Formosa, Chiang had powerful forces armed and trained at American expense, ready to go. Chiang offered them; and MacArthur wanted them; but Washington said no, and even ordered American forces to protect the Chinese mainland *against* Chiang, if Chiang tried an invasion.[3, 4] Not only MacArthur and Chiang but Syngman Rhee perceived the tragedy of this strange policy decision. General James A. Van Fleet tells a poignant story about Syngman Rhee when the first contingent of American troops arrived to participate in the Korean war. Rhee (then President of South Korea) wanted material and technical aid, and air and navy support, from us; but he stood with tears in his eyes as he watched American troops go ashore in Korea, saying there was no need for American ground troops to engage Asians in combat on Asian soil in an Asian war.[6]

At the outset, United States and South Korean forces were vastly outnumbered; and American equipment was distinctly inferior to Soviet equipment used by North Koreans. Yet, within a month (by the end of July, 1950), MacArthur's strategy and fighting men had stopped the communist onslaught. MacArthur held a tip of the Korean peninsula, and was planning a counterattack. The bizarre behavior of Washington and UN leadership (which was to convert the Korean war into disaster for our side) was already apparent. MacArthur's requests for more men and material were denied, ignored, or delayed, and his plans for counteroffensive rejected. MacArthur kept harrassing Washington until, eventually, with the help of other military men in the Pentagon, he received approval for the most brilliant military offensive of all times—the landing at Inchon on September 15, 1950.[3] The Inchon operation isolated huge communist military forces in South Korea. On November 25, 1950, MacArthur was on the banks of the Yalu River, looking into communist China —his vastly outnumbered forces having captured or destroyed all communist armies on the Korean peninsula.[3, 4]

MacArthur had completed his mission. He had not only driven communists from the Korean peninsula, but had won a smashing victory over communism in Asia. Communism, as the force to inflame and mobilize East against West, would have been eliminated if the General had been permitted to make one last stroke, which would have cost no blood on either side.

When MacArthur reached the Yalu in November, 1950, he knew that Chinese communist troops (at least 5000 of them) had already been in action against Americans in Korea. He knew that communists were building up tremendous forces north of the Yalu. He asked permission to destroy all bridges across the river, not only to eliminate the means by which communists could advance to attack his forces, but also to show them that if they did attack they would be hit with the total, awesome might of American military power. The communists would not have braved that danger, and the war in Korea would have been over, a decisive victory for us.[3, 4, 6]

MacArthur was forbidden to destroy the bridges, and could get no clear directive from Washington on what to do. He could only hold his forces on the Yalu, to face limitless hordes from China, when the communists were ready to strike. When they struck, MacArthur was prohibited from striking back, in the only effective way possible: by bombing the Yalu River bridges, and communist supply dumps and troop concentration centers in Manchuria. Truman had already granted the communists a privileged sanctuary in Manchuria. When the human tidal wave rolled across the river, MacArthur's forces retreated, in order and with remarkably low casualties, in a planned maneuver comparable in brilliance to the Inchon landing of two months before. By December, 1950, all of North Korea and much of South Korea were again in communist hands; but MacArthur's forces were still intact; and he was ready to go on the offensive.[3, 4]

Washington officials, ignoring MacArthur's pleas that they untie his hands and let him fight; ignoring his repeated warnings that, in war, "there is no substitute for victory," refused to give any policy guidance beyond vague statements about defensive action to hold communist power near

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the 38th parallel (political dividing line between North and South Korea). Washington also rejected, once again, help offered by Chiang Kai-shek.[3, 4, 6]

Nonetheless, on March 7, 1951, MacArthur attacked, with his hands tied, badly outnumbered, and with no support from Washington. By March 20, he was at the 38th parallel. Communists were retreating in disorder, with heavy losses. U. S. casualties were low. On that day, MacArthur received a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff: the United States had abandoned the original objective of the Korean war (to drive communists from the entire Korean peninsula) and had decided to negotiate a settlement before United States troops went north of the 38th parallel. MacArthur continued his offensive. Twelve days later (April 11, 1951), Truman relieved him of his command.[3, 4]

The commanders who succeeded MacArthur knew that he was right, and they endured the same bitter experience that was his: ordering Americans to die in a war which their government would not permit them to win; giving the enemy a privileged sanctuary from which to strike and kill; prohibiting the use of our own air power to strike enemy supply lines and concentration centers.[3]

Time and again in Korea, when American forces (having sustained heavy losses to beat back tidal-wave assaults by Chinese foot soldiers) had communists retreating in disorder, ready for annihilation, Washington would order our forces to halt and engage in truce talks which communists had requested. Each time, communists would use the truce talks as cover for bringing up fresh forces and supplies for a surprise offensive.[6]

In addition to the United Nations-Washington policy which doomed our soldiers to needless death, there were disturbing indications of communist espionage, amounting to treason, inside the Pentagon. Note this passage from the sworn testimony of General Mark Wayne Clark (last American commander in Korea) before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, on August 10, 1954:

"The Russian MIG planes (and our intelligence indicated that many of them were flown by Russian pilots) were based back at fields [in Manchuria, away from the Yalu River] . . . so that if we ever did decide we were going after them they would have some warning. They had advance fields from which they would fly up to here [along the north bank of the Yalu], refuel, and then come over . . . to attack our planes. We watched these planes and these fields very carefully, because if all of a sudden we might find that there was a tremendous build-up, it might be indicative that they were going to use their air force against us.

"One day I got a report, a flash one, very much concerned, that there was a tremendous build-up of enemy planes there on the north bank of the river. Of course, what I should have done was to smack them. That was my chance to catch their eggs in one basket, but I did not have the authority.

"All I did was to report those facts back to this country, to Washington . . . . Very shortly after that, those planes took off and went someplace else."[7]

Our senior military commanders in Korea—Generals MacArthur, Stratemeyer, Van Fleet, Almond, Clark; and Admiral Joy—all said we could have won the war in Korea and destroyed communist power in Asia, without precipitating general war and with fewer casualties than it cost us to lose it.[6]

We *did* lose it. After 54,246 Americans had died[8] in vain, we signed (at the last humiliating truce conference in Panmunjon, July 27, 1953) an armistice agreement virtually dictated by the communists. Concerning this event, General Clark said:

"In carrying out the instructions of my government, I gained the unenviable distinction of being the first United States Army commander in history to sign an armistice without victory."[9]

Our indecisive action in Korea gave the Chinese communists invaluable training in tactics and weapons of modern warfare and gave them enormous prestige throughout Asia. With the

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armistice that ended the war, we left communists on the 38th parallel in Korea, exactly where they were when the war began. Before the war, they were an untested, largely untrained, mass of humanity. After the war, they were a menacing military colossus, ready to strike at other Asian areas.[6] They have been striking and winning, we have been resisting and losing, ever since: French-Indochina, 1953-1954; Laos, 1955-1962; South Vietnam, 1962-1964.

Note these excerpts from the testimony of General Clark before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in August, 1954:

". . . That was the crucial day in American history in 1950 when thousands upon thousands of Chinese . . . came across the Yalu and killed our men . . . . If I had had authority to bomb the airbases north of the Yalu and the dumps and depots from which they derived their power, I would have done so. I feel that if we had taken that courageous action . . . we would not have had the unhappy end . . . we had in Korea.

"We left, when we signed the armistice in Korea, an enemy on the 38th parallel, right where we started . . . . left him there better trained. We trained him how to fight. We left him there arrogant. He had made the people behind the Iron Curtain think they had won a victory, and we left him poised to strike again, as he did in Indochina."[6, 7]

The disastrous war that was so humiliating for our generals: what was it like for our men? Here is a passage from a Report, published January 11, 1954, by the Senate Subcommittee on Korean War Atrocities:

"The evidence before the subcommittee conclusively proves that American prisoners of war who were not deliberately murdered at the time of capture or shortly after capture, were beaten, wounded, starved, and tortured; molested, displayed, and humiliated before the civilian populace and/or forced to march long distances without benefit of adequate food, water, shelter, clothing, or medical care, to Communist prison camps and there to experience further . . . human indignities.

"Communist massacres and the wholesale extermination of their victims is a calculated part of communist psychological warfare . . . ."[10]

The Senate Subcommittee illustrated these general conclusions by relating specific cases.

For example: On September 26, 1950, communists started 376 American prisoners of war on a 250-mile march from Seoul to Pyongyang in Korea—after having confiscated the prisoners' heavy outer garments and boots. The Americans marched barefoot (many with frozen feet), getting a food ration of one rice ball a day, with little or no water. Beatings, beri-beri, dysentery, pneumonia, and starvation killed 80 prisoners before the remainder reached Pyongyang, where 116 more died in a matter of days. Meanwhile, MacArthur's forces were driving northward, approaching Pyongyang. The 180 American prisoners still surviving the Seoul-Pyongyang death march were herded into open railroad cars, thinly clad and without food, water, or sanitation facilities, for a five-day trip northward. They were unloaded at the Sunchon railroad tunnel on October 30, 1950, taken in groups of 40 to nearby ravines, and mowed down with Russian submachine guns. Only a handful—who had been left for dead—survived. They were rescued in November, when our advancing troops reached Sunchon.[10]

Another example: On July 17, 1950, North Korean forces found an isolated group of about 20 seriously wounded American soldiers. A regimental surgeon (wearing a Red Cross armband) and an Army chaplain (wearing a white cross) were administering aid. Communists shot the chaplain in the back, and sprayed all the rest with gunfire. The Army doctor (left for dead) was the only survivor.[10]

Another example: In late December, 1950, five American airmen in a truck convoy were ambushed and captured by North Koreans. Their bodies (found later by our troops) revealed that they had been tortured with hot bamboo sticks (about 20 holes punctured in each man) and left to bleed to death, slowly.[10]

The Future

All of this now seems horridly unreal, and

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very long ago. Why bring it up? American men are still dying in Asia, fighting an Asian war for Asians, though not yet in such large numbers as in Korea. It is the same enemy we faced in Korea, but stronger and more determined now. The policy of our government is still as senseless as it was then. In Vietnam, Americans in combat can fire at the enemy only after they are fired upon; and the enemy has privileged sanctuaries where he collects his forces for forays against us, where he retreats to safety when he pleases. The only large Asian military forces ready and eager to fight communists (Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese nationalists) are still on Formosa—still being fed, housed, trained, and equipped at our expense, but still kept out of the war against communism which we are waging on the mainland.

Meanwhile, communism grows stronger in Asia—not just as a conquering military power, but as the force which may inflame and mobilize the limitless manpower of the East, against the West. Every indecisive day we stay in Asia fighting Asians, Asian hatred for Americans mushrooms and spreads—not just in communist countries but in practically all Asian nations, even those we have tried the most to help: Indonesia, India, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and now, in South Vietnam where we are making our present "stand against communism."

During the Korean war, we had a sturdy ally in Syngman Rhee's South Korea. Rhee is gone now—to the obvious delight of appeasers in our State Department; and now, though South Korea is still living on American aid, anti-Americanism is growing there. No realist now believes that South Korea would be an asset to us if we became more deeply involved in Asian war.

We never should have become involved in Asian wars. Once in, however, we should have taken the victory that was in our hands, so that we could depart with honor. We rejected every golden opportunity to do that. At every critical juncture since our involvement in Asia, U. S. political leaders have taken the wrong turn. There is really nothing left for us to do but get out, and improve our own national defenses, to protect our own national interests. Otherwise, inevitably, we will become embroiled in another catastrophic cycle of that East-West war between Europe and Asia which has been raging, one way or another, with intervals of calm, for 1500 years.

How, specifically, should we pull out of Asia? We should give Chiang Kai-shek and the world six-months' notice that we plan to get out and let Asians fight their own wars in their own way. During that interval, we should gather military and civilian goods which we are now scattering all over the Far East (to nations which will never use them to fight communism) and divert these supplies to Chiang Kai-shek, giving him our blessing to move with his own men, as he pleases, to rescue his homeland.

Chiang Kai-shek is the only strong anti-communist leader left in Asia. He has fought communists longer than any other man alive. Those who know him well say he is a devout Christian and a great leader—his life dedicated to one purpose: rescuing his homeland from the communists. He was 76 on October 31, 1963. Although he is still vigorous, it is obvious that his time is running out. If he is held in check until too late for him to accomplish his great purpose, it may then be too late for China and all the rest of Asia. Free Chinese on Formosa have been living and building on the hope that they will be permitted to move against the mainland when the time is ripe. It is inconceivable that the time will ever be riper than now.

Since Chiang retreated to Formosa, our aid to his government has averaged about 270 million dollars a year: 100 million in economic aid (chiefly, surplus agricultural commodities); and 170 million in military aid (much of it equipment which U. S. Defense Department officials consider obsolescent). Does it make sense for us to keep supporting the free Chinese as American wards, though we never let them fight our common enemy? Ultimately, inevitably, total war or total surrender will be the outcome of such a policy.

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Some military authorities say that Formosa is vital to our defenses.[3] This is true if, by *our defenses,* we mean the defense of Asia. If we continue to shoulder the responsibility of defending Asia, fighting her wars with our soldiers, we must anticipate that Asia will become a limitless graveyard for our sons. If that is the policy which we are determined to continue, we should hold on to every base and every piece of real estate we have anywhere in the Pacific, and acquire more—at whatever the cost.

But why continue that policy? Neither the military security nor the economic prosperity of our nation requires us to defend any part of Asia; and our government has no right to spend our money or the lives of our sons for such purpose. Bankruptcy and death await us if we do not disengage ourselves from involvement in the political and military affairs of the rest of the world, and look to our own national defense.

Yet, our involvement with regard to China has been sealed by the blood of Americans who have died at the hands of communists. Moreover, our national honor is involved. It is, at least, doubtful that China would ever have been enslaved by communism, or that the Korean war would ever have occurred, had it not been for communist-appeasement policies which the U. S. State Department has followed since Roosevelt's first wartime conference with Stalin.

What if Chiang Kai-shek fails, after we pull out of Asia? One thing we can be sure of: if there are not enough Asians willing and able to fight for their own freedom, with us giving the wherewithal to fight, then Asia cannot be saved. No matter how many American lives our political leaders may be willing to sacrifice in the jungles, deserts, hills, and rice paddies of Asia, we simply do not have enough men to fight Asia's wars for her.

The one remaining strong, determined anti-communist leader in Asia says *he* wants to fight now. Now is the time for us to let him.

* * * * * *

Food Stamp Program

The following is from "Report From Washington," issued April 13, 1964, by United States Representative Richard H. Poff (Republican, Virginia):

"I came to the Floor of the House almost persuaded to vote for the Food Stamp Program. I was impressed with these arguments:

"1) Surplus foods are rotting in Government warehouses where storage bills cost American taxpayers over $1 million a day; why not save that loss by moving them from bins into bellies?

"2) We are giving surplus food to hungry people overseas; why not to hungry Americans?

"3) Why not use surplus foods instead of dollars in public welfare programs?

"It must be acknowledged that these arguments are pretty sound, pretty impressive, pretty persuasive. Just one thing wrong—the Food Stamp Program is not tied to surplus agricultural commodities. Not one pound or peck of the farm products purchased and stored by the taxpayers under the price support program will be used in the Food Stamp Program. Storage costs won't be reduced a dime. Any and all food products except tobacco, liquor and foreign imports, will be bought off the grocer's shelves with Federal food stamps.

"Neither will the food stamps be limited to people on relief rolls. Every household 'whose economic status is such as to be a substantial limiting factor in the attainment of a nutritionally adequate diet' will be eligible. Here is how the program will work:

"1. The householder goes to the local welfare agency and makes application for stamps for himself and his dependents.

"2. The welfare agency applies the needs test.

"3. If the householder passes that test, the welfare agency gives him a certificate stating how much of his budget should be allocated to food purchases.

"4. The householder takes the certificate to the issuing agency (usually a bank) and buys food stamps at a discount of about 40% below face value.

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"5. The householder selects whatever food he wants at a participating grocery and pays for them with stamps.

"6. The grocer cashes these stamps at a participating bank at full face value.

"7. The bank cashes the stamps at face value out of the Federal Treasury.

"8. The Treasury, already operating at a deficit, borrows the money to pay the banks and adds the new obligation to the national debt.

"It will be seen that at no step in this procedure do the surplus farm products in Government warehouses enter the machinery of this program (an amendment to correct this defect was defeated). Accordingly, it is not a surplus disposal program. It is purely and simply a welfare program not confined to those on welfare rolls and financed by the Federal Government . . . ."

There is something else wrong with the Food Stamp Program, even if operated as advertised. It is unconstitutional: nothing in the Constitution authorizes it.

FOOTNOTES

(1) *An Encyclopedia of World History,* edited by William L. Langer, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1948, 44-5; 132-40; 142-3; 260-2; 339-59; 536-58; 872-93; 918; 1117-27

(2) *The Rising Tide of Color,* by Lothrop Stoddard, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York City, 1920, 320 pp.

(3) *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History,* by Major General Courtney Whitney, Alfred A. Knopf, New York City, 1956, 547 pp.

(4) *The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur,* by Frazier Hunt, Devin-Adair Company, New York City, 1954, 533 pp.

(5) *Encyclopedia Americana,* 1961 edition, Volume XVIII, p. 206

(6) *The Korean War and Related Matters,* Report of the U. S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee, January 21, 1955, 25 pp.

(7) "You Can't Win A War If Diplomats Interfere," testimony of General Mark W. Clark, *U. S. News & World Report,* August 20, 1954, pp. 75-81

(8) "The UN Up To Now—6," *The New York Sunday News,* July 8, 1962

(9) Letter from General Mark W. Clark to this office, dated April 24, 1964, quoting from his book, *From the Danube to the Yalu*

(10) *Korean War Atrocities,* U. S. Senate Report No. 848 by the Subcommittee on Korean War Atrocities of the Committee on Government Operations, January 11, 1954, 27 pp.

WHO IS DAN SMOOT?

Born in Missouri, reared in Texas, Dan Smoot went to SMU getting BA and MA degrees, 1938 and 1940. In 1941, he joined the faculty at Harvard as a Teaching Fellow, doing graduate work for a doctorate in American civilization. From 1942 to 1951, he was an FBI agent: three and a half years on communist investigations; two years on FBI headquarters staff; almost four years on general FBI cases in various places. He resigned from the FBI and, from 1951 to 1955, was commentator on national radio and television programs, giving *both* sides of controversial issues. In July, 1955, he started his present profit-supported, free-enterprise business: publishing *The Dan Smoot Report,* a weekly magazine available by subscription; and producing a weekly news-analysis radio and television broadcast, available for sponsorship by reputable business firms, as an advertising vehicle. The *Report* and broadcast give *one* side of important issues: the side that presents documented truth using the American Constitution as a yardstick. If you think Smoot's materials are effective against socialism and communism, you can help immensely—help get subcribers for the *Report,* commercial sponsors for the broadcast.

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